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Summary
Mass privatization offers a particularly suitable framework to study the change in
ownership concentration as the extent of change is unusual for a stable market economy.
Focusing on two different mass privatization schemes in two transition economies,
Poland and the Czech Republic, we find that despite important differences in the design
of the two programmes and despite different quality of legal and regulatory framework,
ownership structure in the two countries has rapidly evolved and the emerging
ownership patterns are remarkably similar. This suggests that private benefits of control
are large and the quality of investor protection regime is low in both countries.
However, looking at the relationship between the change in ownership concentration
and firm performance, we find an interesting difference between the two countries: in
the Czech Republic the increase in ownership concentration seems to be less likely in
poorly performing firms while in Poland the quality of past performance does not affect
investors' willingness to increase their holdings. This effect may be interpreted in the
light of the theory stressing the importance of the quality of investors' protection. It
could be argued that if Czech investors are more risk averse and more concerned with
diversification this is largely due to the weakness of the legal protection they face.
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1. Introduction
Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe strongly relied on ‘wholesale’ methods to transfer
assets from the state to the private sector. These strategies, often qualified as 'mass
privatization', consisted of a free transfer of equity of a large number of firms to large
segments of the population. Since the beginning of transition, mass privatization has been
strongly criticised as being 'artificial' and unable to provide firms with 'real owners' or to
improve firm performance. One of the main criticisms concerned the dispersed ownership
structure that mass privatisation was expected to generate. Some countries, e.g. Poland,
sensitive to this argument, chose to impose a concentrated ownership structure on privatized
firms. The main concern was avoiding excessive dispersion of ownership and providing
companies with ‘effective owners’, capable and willing to enforce control over management
and undertake profound firm restructuring. In other countries, such as the Czech Republic,
where privatization was understood as the key element of the process of radical institutional
change and was expected to create important synergies, the main concern was the speed of the
process and less attention was paid to the emergence of a specific ownership structure.
Several years after the initial distribution of firms' equity, it is still largely believed that mass
privatization schemes were plagued with inefficiencies mostly due to rigid and/or inefficient
ownership structure. However, if we look at the actual change at firm level it turns out that the
effective reallocation of property rights has been quite extensive and that the ownership
concentration has significantly increased.
1 Therefore, it becomes interesting to describe this
evolution in detail and to explore if and how ownership structure adjusted to firm specific
characteristics and to factors characterizing the firm's environment.
It should be stressed that the objective of this paper is quite modest. We do not try to assess
whether and how ownership structure affects performance. Neither have we distinguished the
managerial ownership dimension of ownership structure. These are important questions that
have been studied by a number of authors and also need to be investigated further.
2 In
focusing on the determinants of ownership concentration we follow the literature initiated by
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argued that ownership structure should be
viewed as the result of shareholders’ optimizing decisions.
3 Considering the determinants of
ownership concentration may be viewed as a first step. The next and an important extension
of this paper would be to consider the relationship between ownership and firm performance
in a simultaneous equation framework: in such framework with firm performance and
ownership concentration being the two dependent variables, we could consider potential
causality running form ownership to performance.
                                                
1 Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) document high ownership concentration in a number of transition
economies.
2 For important theoretical contributions see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
Bolton and von Tadden (1998), Burkart et al. (1997). Some of recent empirical papers include
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, et al. (1999), Miguel, et al. (2001).  Works on transition
economies include Claessens and Djankov (1999), Kocenda and Svejnar (2003), and Simoneti, et al.
(2003).
3 For recent contributions, see Bebchuk (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Lamba and Stapledon
(2002). Jones and Mygind (1999) and Jones, et al. (2003) deal with the determinants of ownership
structure in a transition economy.2
We focus on firms privatized through two different mass privatization schemes in two
transition economies, Poland and the Czech Republic. Mass privatization offers a particularly
suitable framework to study the change in ownership concentration as the extent of change is
unusual for a stable market economy. We find that despite important differences in the design
of the two programmes and despite different quality of legal and regulatory framework,
ownership structure in the two countries has rapidly evolved and the emerging ownership
patterns are remarkably similar. Ownership concentration has significantly increased and we
can observe an important reallocation of ownership claims between different groups of
shareholders. In the Czech Republic, starting from a highly dispersed ownership structure, in
almost half of companies a majority of shares is held by a single block holder. Similarly in
Poland, starting from a particular ownership structure imposed by the National Investment
Funds (NIF) programme, the majority of companies involved in the scheme have been freed
of NIFs’ control and almost half of them have found a single block holding entity with a
majority of shares. Ownership concentration, defined as the presence of a majority
shareholder or the increase in the share of the largest owner, seems to be mainly determined
by firms’ past performance and by the identity of the largest owner.
The difference between the two countries appears when we consider how past performance
affects the increase in ownership concentration: it turns out that the impact of past
performance is positive in the Czech Republic and insignificant or even negative in Poland.
This suggests that in Poland shareholders believe they can obtain some benefits of control and
do not fear increasing their holdings in less profitable firms while in the Czech Republic less
profitable firms are considered as too risky and shareholders prefer increasing their equity
holdings in better performing firms. Such result may be interpreted in the light of "law
matters" theory due to La Porta, et al. (1998).
4 The difference in the shareholders' attitude
towards risk in the two countries may indeed be due to the differences in the quality of the
legal framework. Poland is usually praised for high standards of its regulation while the Czech
Republic, especially in the early and mid-1990s, has been blamed for its weaknesses (see
Glaeser, et al., 2001)
The evidence of a dynamic adjustment of the ownership structure provided in this paper
suggests that, contrary to the concern of the critics of mass privatisation programmes, they
were not the most inefficient way of transferring assets from the state to the public sector. The
initial ownership structure they created was transitory and rapidly gave way to new
configurations. This evidence may help to explain the apparently surprising result of Bennett,
et al. (2004). Analyzing the impact of various privatization methods on economic growth in a
cross-country setting, they find that mass privatization was the only method with a
significantly positive effect. Although we do not consider here the relationship between
privatization and performance, the fact that ownership structure in our firms has become
highly concentrated may provide an element of explanation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the two mass privatization
schemes in Poland and in the Czech Republic and show how ownership concentration and the
type of the controlling shareholders have changed since the beginning of the process. In
                                                
4 Looking at cross-country variations, La Porta, et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership
(measured by the stake of the three largest shareholders) is negatively correlated with the quality of
investors’ legal protection. In other words ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal
protection of investors.3
section 3 we consider the potential determinants of ownership concentration. Empirical model
is presented in section 4, the results in section 5 and we conclude in section 6.
2. Mass Privatisation and after: reallocation of equity stakes in the Czech
Republic and Poland.
Despite broad similarity of their reform programme, Poland and the Czech Republic
embarked on two different variants of mass privatisation (briefly described in Appendix 1).
Various political and social considerations played a role. Most importantly, the choice was
determined by the policy makers’ understanding of the role of privatisation in market
processes. In Poland privatisation was seen as a means of improving firm incentives and its
real objective was firm restructuring. More orthodox methods of privatisation (IPOs,
negotiated sales, auctions, etc.) were seen as more efficient from that point of view, but it
soon became clear that privatisation would be too slow if it were to rely exclusively on such
methods. Therefore, the National Investment Funds (NIF) programme was initiated to
supplement other methods and speed up the process. The design of this programme was
dominated by the concern about corporate governance arrangements favouring enterprise
restructuring. In particular, a concentrated ownership structure was imposed on firms and the
funds were to be managed by highly experienced Western specialists.
In the Czech Republic (and before that in Czechoslovakia) privatisation was understood as the
precondition for the emergence of a market environment. Voucher privatisation was seen as
the most rapid and the least unfair way of transferring assets from the State sector. It was
expected that under competitive pressure the initial ownership structure would gradually
evolve towards a more effective structure.
The two different philosophies underlying the two mass privatisation programmes are
reflected in the design of the regulations of securities markets in the two countries. Poland is
usually given as an example of a good regulatory strategy while the Czech Republic is blamed
for the weakness of its regulatory framework (Glaeser, et al., 2001). Indeed, the Polish
authorities were concerned with the proper development of financial markets in general, and
the stock exchange in particular, and focused on the creation of a well established legal
system and enforceable laws. In the NIF programme, the remuneration scheme for NIF
managers and the stock exchange listing requirements were carefully designed to ensure the
transparency of the process and to avoid expropriation of minority investors. The main
concern was to avoid excessive dispersion of ownership and to provide companies with
'effective owners'. But the authors of the programme were also concerned with the potential
danger of private benefits of control and therefore imposed the limit of 33 percent on the lead
fund’s holdings in each company.
Such guarantees were deemed unnecessary in the Czech Republic: there was a fear that state
intervention would create impediments to a rapid development of market institutions. The
Company law and the laws governing the operation of securities markets were very lax and
the supervision of securities trading and the associated agents were, until 1998, left to a
Securities Office in the Ministry of Finance. Privatised companies were listed on the stock
exchange without having to publish a prospectus and to obtain the approval of the securities
regulator. The increasing number of financial scandals and opportunistic behaviour involving
funds and enterprise managers (later called ‘tunnelling’) reflected the weakness of the regulatory4
framework.
5 The pressure from the opposition parties and the press eventually forced the
government to establish the Securities Commission.
The Data
The data for Czech companies is provided by a Czech commercial company, Aspekt
(www.aspekt.cz) who use official company accounts filed by joint stock companies (for
financial information), Prague Securities Centre (for ownership information), and company
reports for employment and other information. The financial data covers the period of 1993-
1999 while the ownership data covers the period 1996 to 1999. The data-set was purchased in
early 2000 and consequently the information for 1999 is not complete for all companies. The
ownership data includes the identity and the equity holdings of up to seven largest
shareholders of each company since 1996. There are five types of owners: industrial and
commercial companies (corporations), investment funds, financial institutions,
6 individuals
and the state. The database does not identify foreign ownership.
The data set contains financial information on the bulk of mass privatised companies but the
ownership information is limited to a smaller number of companies because many mass
privatised companies have left the stock exchange, changed their legal status or have been
taken over by other companies. After careful cleaning of the data base (involving the deletion
of observations containing obvious errors) we established a balanced panel of 652 companies
for which full ownership information is available for the 1996-1999 period.
7 The sample is
well distributed across 12 sectors of economic activity.
8
The Polish data set, containing all 512 mass privatised companies and covering the 1995-2000
period, was collected from several sources. The Ministry of State Treasury (Department of
Privatisation) keeps some basic data on the 512 companies in the National Investment Fund
Programme, largely for the period before their privatisation. The Department keeps a record
of major changes in the status of these companies. Additional information was collected from
the annual reports of NIFs and their portfolio companies through the publication Monitor
Polski, NIFs' annual reports and the reports of the Association of National Investment Funds.
For companies that have been floated on the stock exchange, further information was obtained
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In the final sample analyzed in this paper we do not
include firms that went bankrupt or for some reasons were deleted from the registry kept in
the Ministry of State Treasury. We also exclude observations with missing data. The number
of firms in the sample was therefore reduced to 439.
                                                
5  For examples of opportunistic behaviour by managers and large shareholders, see Hashi (1998);
Johnson, et al. (2000) and Glaeser, et al. (2001).
6 The data set contained two sub-groups of financial institutions: portfolio companies (which are
engaged primarily in buying and selling of shares) and banks. However, as the number of firms in
these two sub-groups was small, they were combined together under ‘financial institutions’ in order to
make the empirical work more meaningful.
7 There are occasionally missing observations for individual variables which lowers the number of
observations to 610 in the regressions presented in Section 5.
8 Originally firms were grouped into 19 activities based on Prague Stock Exchange classification of
sectoral activity (which closely resembles NACE classification) but as the number of firms in some
sectors was very small, for reasons of empirical feasibility, we grouped firms in similar activities and
formed 12 industrial sectors.5
Unlike in the Czech Republic, the initial ownership structure of the companies in the mass
privatisation scheme was uniform and fixed by the scheme (the lead fund had 33 percent of
shares; other 14 funds 27 percent; employees 15 percent and the state 25 percent). The
information on ownership change throughout the period 1995-2000, collected from the variety
of sources described above, allows identifying the largest owners of the companies. It shows
the extent of the divestiture by NIFs. The distinction is made between foreign and domestic
shareholders; among the latter there are companies, NIFs, employees, individuals and the
state.
Changes in the ownership structure
We focus on two dimensions of the change in the ownership structure. First, we look at
ownership concentration, measured by the share of the largest owner. Second, we consider the
reallocation of block holdings between different types of owners. The evidence from both
Poland and the Czech Republic points to an unambiguous increase in concentration of
ownership in both countries. Table 1 highlights the broad picture of this evolution.
The average holdings of the largest shareholder in the Czech sample increased rapidly from
38.8 percent in 1996 to 51.9 percent in 1999 and in the Polish sample from 33.9 percent in
1996 to 50.3 percent in 2000. In the Czech Republic the median figure indicates that by 1999
in half of the sample firms the largest owner held almost 50 percent of the firm's equity. The
number of firms in which the largest shareholder controls more than 50 percent of shares
increased indeed from 189 in 1996 to 289 in 1999.
The Polish scheme, due to its cautious design, had a degree of inertia built into it. Dominant
owners, i.e., the ‘lead funds’ holding 33 percent of company shares initially, could not
increase their share in portfolio companies until they were floated on the stock market or their
capital was increased. At the same time, companies could not be floated on the stock market
until they could meet (as any listed company) the stringent listing criteria set by the regulatory
agency. Despite these restrictions, a significant reallocation of equity holdings, triggered by a
combination of the NIFs' incentive system and the competitive pressure from the product and
factor markets, occurred quite rapidly. NIFs have withdrawn from managing a large number
of portfolio companies. Some firms were floated on the stock exchange, others were sold to
strategic (domestic or foreign) investors, and some were put into liquidation. NIFs proved to
be the agents of privatisation rather than agents of restructuring. The net results, as panel (b)
of Table 1 shows, were that by the year 2000, the largest shareholders were, on average, in
absolute control of their companies. The differences in the initial ownership structure
notwithstanding, the process was very similar to that in the Czech Republic.
The second dimension of the change in the ownership structure is the reallocation of
ownership rights between different types of largest shareholders. This process was different in
the two samples because of the particularities of the privatization process in the two countries
and the initially uniform ownership structure of the Polish firm. In Poland, the reallocation of
ownership was first dominated by the transfer from the state to NIFs and then from NIFs to
other types of owners. While in 1994 all firms were state-owned, by 2000 the state had
reduced its holdings to zero in 99 firms and to about 20 percent (on average) in the remaining
firms. About 15 percent of the companies in the scheme went bankrupt or entered the
bankruptcy or liquidation processes. 36 companies (about 7 percent of the companies in the6
scheme, 25 of them with strategic investors) have satisfied the listing conditions set by the
Warsaw Stock Exchange and were quoted on the WSE in 2000.
Tables 2 and 3 show how equity held by different types of the largest owner has evolved in
Poland between 1998 and 2000 and in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 1999.
In Poland NIFs have withdrawn from 240 firms leaving the companies to the new owner, with
over 20 percent of them (52 companies) having been sold to foreign investors. Concerning the
concentration of ownership stakes, it is striking that, on average, most strategic investors have
gained majority control of the firms' equity. Only NIFs, on average, hold 37 percent of shares
of their portfolio companies. The employees, who were given special privileges in the Polish
mass privatization, have acquired control of 13 companies. The highest ownership
concentration (75 percent) can be observed in firms bought by foreign investors.
Similarly, in the Czech Republic we can observe a gradual process of reallocation of large
block holdings between different types of owners. In the immediate post-privatization period,
the state, financial institutions and investment funds were the most important large
shareholders. A couple of years later we can observe the emergence of individual
entrepreneurs and industrial and commercial companies as the largest shareholders. All
categories of largest owners have increased their equity stakes. Industrial and commercial
companies and financial institutions have increased their average holding to over 56 percent
while individuals and investment funds have increased their average holding to around 45-46
percent.
The unusually rapid changes in ownership structure in firms included in the mass privatisation
programmes in the Czech Republic and Poland give us the opportunity to empirically
investigate the determinants of these changes. The owners’ desire to change the initially
imposed (Poland) or inefficient (the Czech Republic) ownership structure reflected, and
certainly responded to, a variety of firm specific characteristics and factors representing the
environment in which firms operate. In what follows we try to identify the determinants of the
increase in ownership concentration in the group of Czech and Polish firms.
3. What makes ownership more or less concentrated?
We look at within country variations in ownership structure which means that we do not
consider here the important issue on which the work by La Porta, et al. (1998) focused:
9 legal
and regulatory constraints are held constant. We try to identify the determinants of ownership
concentration at the level of the firm. We use two dummy variables for ownership
concentration: 1) the increase/decrease of the share of the largest owner since the initial
allocation of property rights, and 2) the presence/absence of a majority shareholder (holding
more than 50 percent of shares).
In line with several previous studies investigating the determinants of ownership
concentration, we expect the following factors to influence our two dependent variables:
                                                
9 Looking at cross-country variations, La Porta, et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership
(measured by the stake of the three largest shareholders) is negatively correlated with the quality of
investors' legal protection. In other words, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal
protection of investors.7
Performance
Owners’ decision to increase their holding may depend on firm performance. It is possible
that in less profitable firms shareholders want to increase their holdings in order to better
control the management and obtain some of the benefits of control. On the other hand, such
firms may be less attractive for risk-averse shareholders looking for risk diversification. The
impact of performance on owners’ decision to concentrate their holdings is therefore
ambiguous.
10
It is difficult to choose an ideal performance indicator for non-listed firms in transition
economies. We use profit before taxes and depreciation which is the commonly used measure.
Alternatively, we use the growth of sales as a measure of performance: it is sometimes argued
that it is less subject to accounting manipulations. Additionally, we include investment which
may be considered as a proxy for the future prospects of the firm. We expect that higher
investment activity leads current and potential shareholders to increase their holdings in the
firm.
Size
It is usually expected that ownership in larger firms is less likely to be highly concentrated.
Purchasing large equity shares in a large company is more expensive than doing the same in a
smaller company. Moreover, the concern for diversification also suggests that owners will be
careful and refrain from committing a larger fraction of their wealth to one firm. In some
previous studies (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) firm size was inversely related to ownership
concentration. On the other hand, in the highly uncertain conditions of transition economies,
larger, older and better known firms may be perceived by some shareholders as less likely to
go bankrupt. In this case, such shareholders would increase their shareholding in larger firms.
The overall impact of size on ownership structure may thus be ambiguous.
Leverage
Also the effect of leverage on ownership concentration may be ambiguous. Highly leveraged
firms are more risky and risk averse owners may prefer avoiding excessive concentration in
such firms (Stulz 1988, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Similarly, if leverage is seen as a control
instrument used to reduce agency costs and creditors substitute owners in their monitoring
activities, we would expect ownership concentration to be lower in more leveraged firms. But
debt may also be viewed as complementary monitoring device: in that case higher ownership
concentration may appear in more indebted companies.
Identity of the dominant shareholder
                                                
10 This ambiguity appears in the previous works. For instance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find
that performance has a significant and negative effect on ownership concentration while in Jones, et al.
(2003) previous profitability does not affect ownership structure in a significant way.8
The degree of ownership concentration may strongly depend on who the largest shareholder
is. It is therefore important to distinguish between different types of block holders. For
example, a corporation may have stronger motivation than a financial institution to acquire
large stakes in a firm. The state and the National Investment Funds in Poland are supposed to
wither away as owners and we expect that their equity will progressively diminish. The
nationality of the dominant owners may also affect ownership concentration: foreign owners
may be more willing and capable of acquiring larger stakes in order to control the company.
In Poland we can distinguish between foreign and domestic investors; and among the latter
between corporations, individuals, employees, NIFs and the state. In the Czech Republic we
can distinguish between corporations, individuals, investment funds, financial institutions, and
the state.
Industry
Ownership concentration may vary across industries. Some industries are more likely to have
dispersed ownership than others. One of the possible explanations of these differences would
be that different types of activities require different level of monitoring.
11 In some industries
closer monitoring may bring about gains to shareholders
12 while in others, especially those
regulated by the state, additional monitoring by large shareholders may not yield any
benefits.
13 Hence, we have to control for the type of the industry in order to take this effect
into account.
4. The model
We analyse the determinants of ownership concentration using two dependent variables. First,
we estimate the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased since the initial
allocation of equity stakes (Y1). This was the case in 491 firms in the Czech Republic and in
219 firms in Poland. Secondly, we estimate the probability that a company has a majority
shareholder at the end of the considered period (Y2). In our samples, 44 percent of firms in
Poland in 2000 and 49 percent in the Czech Republic in 1999 have a shareholder with more
than 50 percent of shares.
We use the following general model to identify the factors that affect our dependent variables:









                                                
11 See Carlin and Mayer (1999) and Allen (1993).
12 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) call it 'control potential' and Bebchuk (1999) speaks about private benefits
of control.
13 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, e.g., control for regulated industries
(financial and utilities).9
P (Y1 = 1/ X ) is the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased since the
beginning of the process and
P (Y2 = 1/ X ) is the probability that the largest owner holds more than 50 percent of shares,
both conditioned on the realization of  X , which represents the vector of explanatory
variables and β  is the corresponding vector of coefficients.
The vector of explanatory variables  X  includes the following variables: performance, size,
leverage, investment, type of the largest owner, industry, and a set of variables representing
specific features of mass privatisation in the two countries.
Performance is defined as ratio of earnings before taxes and depreciation to total assets (the
growth of sales is used as another proxy for performance); size is measured by natural
logarithm of sales in constant prices; leverage is defined as total liabilities over total assets;
investment is the ratio of net investment in fixed assets to total assets. In order to alleviate the
problem of potential endogeneity of ownership concentration, the four variables
(performance, size, leverage and investment) are averaged over the period ending one year
earlier than the year for which ownership is considered. (i.e., 1996-1998 for the Czech sample
and 1995-1999 for the Polish sample). Type of owner is a set of dummies representing
different types of the largest shareholder. Industry represents a set of dummies for industries
to which the firm belongs (12 for Czech firms and 20 in Poland).
In the case of the Czech Republic we want to distinguish between firms that were privatised
in the first and in the second wave of the voucher scheme. We also include the initial level of
ownership concentration (in 1996).
14 We obviously expect that the increase in ownership
concentration will be less likely in firms that were initially already highly concentrated. Such
firms are also more likely to have at the end of the process a majority investor. In Poland, the
initial level of ownership concentration was by design the same for all firms so we do not
include this variable in the regressions. In the case of Polish mass privatised firms we
distinguish between listed and non-listed firms by using a dummy variable for firms that are
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). It may be expected that firms listed on the
stock exchange are more likely to have widely held share ownership structure. We also want
to distinguish between various National Investment Funds and we include a set of dummies
representing the lead National Investment Fund of each company (15 NIFs altogether). We
know that these funds differed in their strategies towards firms in their portfolios: some funds
behaved more like venture capital funds while others chose strategies of purely financial
intermediaries. Firms' ownership concentration might have been influenced by these
strategies. The full list of variables is presented in Table 4.
5. The results
Tables 5 and 6 show respectively the results for Poland and for the Czech Republic. For each
of the two dependent variables we present two sets of regressions: with and without dummies
representing the type of the largest shareholder. For Poland additionally, before adding all
types of domestic owners, we show, in columns 2 and 5 the results of the regression in which
only foreign versus domestic owner is considered.
                                                
14 Ownership concentration is measured by the share of the largest shareholder. In the regression
analysis, we use a logistic transformation of this measure. See table 4 for the exact definition.10
The inclusion of the type of the largest owner significantly improves the explanatory power of
the regressions, particularly in Poland. In both countries most of the coefficients of the
dummies representing the type of the largest owner are significant.
15  In particular, in Poland
the firm is significantly more likely to be majority controlled if it has a foreign largest
shareholder. The presence of a foreign dominant shareholder also significantly influences the
probability of an increase in its equity holdings. Interpreting the coefficients of various
dummies representing the types of owners we should remember that the reference group is the
state in the Czech Republic and the state together with NIFs in Poland .These types of owners
are supposed to wither away and therefore it is not surprising that other categories are more
likely to increase their equity holdings and to take majority control.
We do not observe a significant relationship between ownership concentration and either
leverage or investment. But some of the privatisation-related variables turn out to be quite
important. Firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are less likely to experience
increasing concentration and are less likely to have a majority owner. It could be argued that
ownership dispersion is safer in listed firms as investors have access to a much greater amount
of information and also a certain amount of monitoring is undertaken by the financial market
itself. So the opportunities for reaping the benefits of control by increasing ownership
concentration and monitoring are more limited. Moreover, according to the regulation of the
WSE, beyond a certain level of ownership concentration, the dominant shareholders have to
make compulsory purchase offers to other shareholders, which may require a prohibitively
large amount of resources. In the Czech Republic, as expected, the higher the initial level of
ownership concentration, the lower the probability that the share of the largest shareholder has
increased and the higher the probability that the firm has found a majority owner.
The evidence about the importance of firm size is mixed: it becomes insignificant in Poland
when all types of largest owners are included and only slightly positive in the Czech
Republic. This result suggests that the desire of diversification and the search for a safe
investment (which large firms may offer in an uncertain environment) counteract each other.
More importantly, we get a contrasting result comparing the correlation between firms' past
performance and ownership concentration in the two countries. In Poland firm's past
performance does not seem to affect the probability of the increase in the share of the largest
owner (it is even slightly negative if we do not control for the type of the largest owner). Also,
the presence of a majority shareholder is more likely in firms characterized by poor past
profitability. In contrast, in the Czech Republic the coefficient of past profitability is positive
and affects very strongly the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased. This
result may reflect the owners' willingness to avoid increasing their equity holdings in the
Czech poorly performing firms. In Poland, investors appear more likely trying to reap some
benefits of control.
16
                                                
15 Only in the Czech Republic the presence/absence of a majority shareholder is not affected by the
largest shareholder being an individual or an investment fund. These two categories of owners were
the main players in the auctions of the voucher scheme and their behaviour might not differ
significantly from the state, which is here the base group.
16 Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) show that the performance of Polish listed firms improves when the
largest owner has a majority stake in the company.11
The results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of firm performance:  the growth of
sales, and an alternative measure of firm size:  the natural logarithm of the value of assets.
17
6. Conclusions
In firms privatized in the framework of mass privatization programmes in Poland and the
Czech Republic we observe a significant increase in ownership concentration measured by the
share of the largest owner. This evidence goes against the main argument of the critics of
mass privatization programmes who were convinced that these programmes would bring
about dispersed ownership structure at firm level. The fact that the evolution of ownership
concentration is similar in Poland and in the Czech Republic suggests that private benefits of
control are large in both countries (see Bebchuk, 1999). If we refer to 'law matters' theory, this
suggests that the quality of investor protection regime is rather low in both countries. So we
do not get a confirmation of the usual view that the Polish legal and regulatory framework is
much better than the one in the Czech Republic. However, although the direct comparison of
ownership concentration in the two countries does not provide a confirmation of the main
prediction of 'law matters' theory, we find indirect evidence in its favour.
Looking at the relationship between the change in ownership concentration and firm
performance, we find an interesting result: in the Czech Republic the increase in ownership
concentration seems to be less likely in poorly performing firms while in Poland the quality of
past performance does not affect investors' willingness to increase their holdings. This
contrasting effect may be interpreted in the light of the theory stressing the importance of the
quality of investors' protection. It could be argued indeed that if Czech investors seem to be
more risk averse and more concerned with diversification this is largely due to the weakness
of the legal protection they face.
                                                
17 The results are available on request.12
APPENDIX
Mass Privatisation in the Czech Republic
The main method of privatisation in the Czech Republic was ‘voucher privatisation’ through
which some 1700 companies were privatised in two ‘waves’ in 1991–92 and 1992–94. 
18 The
shares of these companies were transferred to either individuals or privatisation investment
funds (PIFs) in exchange for vouchers. PIFs set up by manufacturing companies, private
individuals and institutions as well as state-owned banks and insurance companies, actively
participated in the process as financial intermediaries. Adult citizens received vouchers which
they could exchange for the shares of companies in the scheme either directly or indirectly
through privatisation investment funds. In the latter case, they could entrust their vouchers to
investment funds and become shareholders of these funds (which were joint stock companies)
or unit holders in unit trusts. The funds, in turn, could use vouchers collected from their
members to bid for shares of their preferred companies. Understandably, given the prevailing
information asymmetry and risk aversion, the majority of citizens opted for the second
alternative and entrusted their vouchers to investment funds. In the first wave, 72 percent of
investment points available were used by funds and 28 percent by individuals directly. In the
second wave, the percentages were 64 percent and 36 percent respectively. The bulk of
investment points controlled by funds were concentrated in the hands of a small number of
funds set up by banks and financial institutions (Hashi 1998). In the first wave, these funds
were all close-end funds but in the second wave many of them took the form of unit trusts.
Later on, as part of the reform of the financial system, close-end funds were required to
convert themselves to open funds by 2002. Initially, the funds were allowed to hold up to 20
percent of the shares of each company in the scheme, though they quickly found ways of
bypassing this constraint. The funds’ maximum holding in each company was later reduced to
11 percent.
The shares of mass privatised companies and privatisation investment funds were
immediately listed on the stock market without the requirement of prior approval and the
publication of a prospectus. The process of buying and selling of shares, and the
reorganisation of funds’ portfolios, quickly followed the two waves – a process generally
referred to as the ‘third wave’ of privatisation. Investment funds, despite their large overall
stakes, were generally not in a controlling position in their portfolio companies. Many funds
had ended up with shares of too many companies and wanted to reduce the size of their
portfolios. Many individual shareholders, preferring cash to risky shares, also entered the
secondary market, selling their shares, thus further pushing down share prices.
19 A major
feature of the so-called third wave of privatisation was the take-over of investment funds.
Given that PIFs (especially those set up in the first wave) were joint stock companies with a
large number of shareholders, they were easy targets for aggressive bidders.
                                                
18 For details of the Czech privatization see Mejstrik (1997).
19  It was estimated that in the early post-privatization period up to one-third of individuals who had
obtained shares in the voucher scheme sold their shares. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Report, 2nd Quarter 1995, p. 15.13
Mass Privatisation in Poland
The scale of the Polish mass privatisation was less spectacular than the Czech scheme. It
included 512 companies and 15 National Investment Funds (NIF), which were set up by the
Government.
20 The management of these funds was initially entrusted to special consortia of
Western and Polish partners (commercial banks, investment banks, consulting firms) selected
through an international tender offer. The implementation of the programme was delayed by
at least four years (1991-95) for political reasons, mainly the absence of a consensus in the
government and the parliament about the final list of companies in the scheme, the precise
share of different beneficiaries and the specific arrangements concerning corporate
governance of the NIFs. The equity of 512 companies was transferred from the state to new
owners according to a common scheme: the majority of shares of each company (60 percent)
were given to the 15 National Investment Funds, with the remaining 40 percent going to
employees (15 percent) and the Treasury (25 percent). For each company, one of the 15 NIFs
received 33 percent of shares and thus became the ‘lead fund’ for that company. The
remaining 27 percent were divided between the other 14 funds (each holding just under 2
percent of shares). This uniform scheme sharply contrasted with the Czech programme where
the outcome of the bidding process was completely unforeseeable and any number of funds,
individuals and other beneficiaries could end up as new owners of the companies.
Foreign financial institutions were invited to participate in the programme and, together with
Polish institutions, bid for the management of NIFs under lucrative remuneration
arrangements. The aim was to bring in the fund management know-how and expertise and
ensure that Polish institutions learn from their foreign partners. At the same time, foreign
institutions with international reputation were expected to follow the same practice as in their
own countries, and not to engage in opportunistic behavior, insider dealing and shareholder
expropriation which their inexperienced Polish counterparts may have been tempted to
embark on. Many foreign institutions did take part in the programme and most NIFs started to
be managed by consortia of foreign and Polish institutions.
The citizens did not become direct shareholders of companies in the scheme but received
vouchers (or certificates) which entitled them to one share in each of the 15 Funds, thus
becoming indirect shareholders of privatised companies. The stated aim of the programme
was for NIFs to restructure their portfolio companies, turn them into market oriented firms
and sell them to either strategic owners or on the stock exchange. The Funds themselves were
floated on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in June 1997 and the citizens’ certificates had to be
converted to Funds’ shares by the end of 1998. Following a buoyant initial market, and the
large-scale sale and purchase of shares, the role of the government began to decline and
private owners began to dominate the NIFs. After the first general meetings of shareholders,
members of the supervisory boards initially appointed by the government were replaced by
members elected by new private shareholders. The direct role of the state in the funds came to
an end.
                                                
20  For details of the Polish mass privatisation, see Hashi (2000) and Mickiewicz and Baltowski
(2003).14
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Table 1: Average shareholdings of the largest owner in mass privatised firms
(a) Czech Republic
1996 1997 1998 1999
Mean 38.8 42.8 48.6 51.9
Median 36.3 42.0 47.5 49.7
Std. Dev. 19.3 20.4 21.5 21.8
Number of firms 652 652 652 652
(b) Poland
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean 33.9 36.7 42.1 47.7 50.3
Median 33 33 33 33 33
Std. Dev. 5.5 10.1 15.8 20.6 22.6
Number of firms 441 440 439 439 439
Source: Own calculation18
Table 2: Poland: The largest shareholder in mass privatized firms, 1998-2000
For each type of the largest shareholder the first row shows the number of firms, the second the
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Table 3: Czech Republic: the largest shareholder in mass privatised firms,
1996-1999
For each type of the largest shareholder the first row shows the number of firms, the second the
average equity holdings and the third its standard deviation
1996 1997 1998 1999
Individual
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Table 4: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Return on assets Ratio of earnings before taxes and depreciation to total assets.
Size Natural logarithm of sales (in constant prices)
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Investment Ratio of net investment in fixed assets to total assets
Type of the largest
owner
Dummies for different types of the largest shareholder in 1999 in
the Czech Republic and in 2000 in Poland. In Poland we have
foreign versus domestic investors, among which we distinguish
between corporations, individuals, employees, the state and
National Investment Funds. In the Czech Republic, there are five
types of the largest owners: corporations, individuals, investment
funds, financial institutions, and the state.
First wave of voucher
privatisation in the
Czech Republic
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for companies included in
the first wave of voucher privatisation, and 0 otherwise
Share of the largest
owner in 1996
Logistic transformation of the percentage share of the largest
shareholder (C1) of a company:  ln [C1/(100-C1)]
National Investment
Fund dummies
Dummies for each of the 15 lead NIFs
Industry dummies Dummies for industries to which firms belong. There are 12
industries in the Czech Republic and 20 in Poland23
Table 5: Determinants of ownership concentration in Poland (probit
regressions)
In columns (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variable is equal to one if in 2000 the firm has an owner with
at least 50% of shares and zero otherwise. In columns (4), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is equal
to one if the share of the largest owner has increased between 1995 and 2000 and zero otherwise. All
independent variables, except dummies, are averaged over 1995-1999. The type of the largest owner
refers to 2000. Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at
the 5 percent level; and *** significant at the 1 percent level. All regressions include a constant term;
the reference group for the ‘type of the largest owner’ is the combined category of State and National
Investment Fund.
See Table 4 for detailed definitions of variables.
Increase in the share of the largest
owner 1995 - 2000
Presence of a majority shareholder
in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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NIF dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 434 434 434 434 434 434
Pseudo R
2 0.160 0.237 0.415 0.183 0.274 0.47524
Table 6: Determinants of ownership concentration in the Czech Republic
(probit regressions)
In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is equal to one if in 1999 the firm has an owner with at
least 50% of shares and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is equal to one
if the share of the largest owner has increased between 1996 and 1999. All independent variables,
except dummies, are averaged over 1995-1999. The type of largest owner refers to 1999. Standard
errors are in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; and
*** significant at the 1 percent level. All regressions include a constant term; the reference group for
the ‘type of the largest owner’ is ‘State’.
See Table 4 for detailed definitions of variables.
Increase in the share of  the
 largest owner 1996 – 1999
(1)                 (2)
Presence of a majority owner
in 1999
      (3)                        (4)
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Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 610 610 610 610
Pseudo R
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